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Abstract- The emergence of flexible supply chain systems
(FSC) has sparked increased interest in real-time planning,
scheduling, and logistics--with particular consideration for
strategic implications and overall cost control. Important
aspects of an FSC include forecasting, production, materials
handling, transportation, and distribution center inventory.
There exists a variety of software applications for addressing
tactical issues, such as adaptive scheduling, and short term
forecasting. However, these programs typically do not permit
the user to assess the strategic implications of different policies
for flexing capacity and making alternative commitments to
manufacturing plants. Recently there has been increased
interest in the use of simulation models for strategic policy
analysis. Simulation compares favorably to purely analytical
methods that often fail to capture the complex interactions of a
particular FSC. The challenge is to create an FSC

simulation model that is general enough and flexible
enough to allow the user to analyze the overall costs and
benefits of different policies. This paper presents just
such an FSC model, implemented in a system dynamics
modeling language. The model is specifically designed to
help the user evaluate different policies for scheduling
production in the factories and policies that govern
factory capacity…in terms of their impact on overall
production cost and inventory turns. Preliminary
results include new insights regarding the conventional
wisdom that minimizing the incremental amount that a
factory can fluctuate at any given point in tam will
reduce cost. The model suggests the contrary, that
requiring larger fluctuations actually reduces the
frequency and overall magnitude of the changes without
adverse impact on factory utilization.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of flexible supply chain systems (FSC)
has sparked increased interest in real-time planning,
scheduling, and logistics--with particular consideration for
strategic implications and overall cost control [9].
Important aspects of an FSC include forecasting,
production, materials handling, transportation, and
distribution center inventory [14]. Strategic activities focus
on setting integrated global policies and contract
negotiations. Real-time activities primarily refer to weekly

operations that require efficient, timely, and adaptive
responses to customer expectations, short-term
scheduling, and execution concerns [6]. There are a
variety of software applications that provide visibility and
control of the tactical issues. What is lacking are tools for
assessing the efficacy of global strategic policies
including capacity planning, phased commitment to
manufacturing, transportation, and distribution center
inventory management.
Recently there has been increased interest in the use
of simulation for evaluating policies for real-time
planning, operational control, adaptive scheduling and
planning, and forecasting [14]. The use of simulation
appears to compare favorably to purely analytical
methods that often fail to capture the complex interactions
of a particular FSC[5] and is well established in the
literature as highly applicable in operations and strategic
management [4,8,10]. Applying simulation as a real-time
tool requires insight into the role of the simulation model
within the overall FSC [7]. The challenge is to find a way
to represent in an operational model the problems and
decision-making requirements for an FSC so that one may
assess the costs and benefits of various policies or
business process changes which would provide managers
with a powerful tool which can be used to provide direct
competitive advantage [5,15]. This paper presents a
system dynamics-based flexible supply chain model for
evaluating different capacity planning policies and
analyzing their impact on overall production cost.

II. STRATEGY AND EXPECTATIONS
A. Objective
Our objective is to determine a cost optimal
aggregate factory load policy (AFLP) that enables high
customer satisfaction and responsive to demand swings
and perturbations. We have chosen to focus on factory
capacity (equals production capacity) since it is key to
cost control, customer satisfaction, and efficient resource
utilization [11]. Cost is defined to be a combination of
real cost and shadow cost for the full supply chain from

demand forecast through to the customer. Shadow cost is
used in the case when observed prices fail to accurately
reflect the social value of a good, or prices do not exist at
all. Aggregate factory load is a function of usage, available
capacity, and throughput.

B. System Components
We will use five major supply chain components: (1)
demand, (2) build, (3) transportation, (4) distribution
centers (DC), and (5) Customer [3]. The major
components are depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Major Components of the Supply Chain
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The components of a supply chain can be clustered into
three different categories based on the level of control that
the manufacturing companies can exercise; (1) no control,
(2) tactical control, and (3) strategic control.
(1) No control is defined as having at best limited
reactionary control over the parameters involved, and
includes actual demand and customer satisfaction.
Demand is the driver of all actions within the supply
chain.
Although significant effort is placed on
forecasting, the forecast does not drive the factory,
actual demand does. Thus, the creation of a flexible
supply chain that can react to the fluctuations and
perturbations in demand is one of the keys to success.
(2) Tactical control refers to supply chain activities that
can quickly respond to changing short-term situations.
Mode of transportation is the only component of this
type considered in our model.
(3) Finally, there are aspects of the manufacturing that are
flexible, but only within specified predetermined
parameters that are dictated by corporate policy or prenegotiated contracts. These are classified as strategic
control components. Two examples are Factory
capacity and distribution center (DC) capacity. For
example, a factory could be prepared to manufacture
10,000 units per week, but if they worked double or

triple shifts they could manufacture as much as 18,000
units. However, to manufacture more than 18,000
units they would need to physically add manufacturing
machines and train additional labor. Similarly, if the
factory is prepared to manufacture 10,000 units per
week and only receives a request for 3,000 units,
sectors of the factory would have to shut down thereby
eroding the factories projected revenue, potentially to
the point that the factory would need to close.
III. FSC SIMULATION MODEL
Many large companies are structured such that each
individual component of the supply chain works to produce
optimum results within its sector at a tactical level. For
example, logistics will try to reduce airfreight while
manufacturing will try and level load the factories resulting
in an increase in airfreight. However, we will be presenting
an integrated or strategic model representing the interaction
amongst the sectors [12] and aid in policy evaluation that
will improve customer satisfaction and reduce overall
supply chain cost [13]. Of the two factors that are able to be
controlled strategically, factory and DC capacity, DC
capacity is significantly more difficult to change than
factory capacity because a substantial change in DC
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capacity requires a DC to be bought or sold thus having
significant capital dollar impact.
Therefore, for our model, DC capacity will be
considered to be static. Factory capacity, however, can be
renegotiated as often as quarterly without significant capital
expenditure. The objective of the model is to determine the
appropriate level of carrying capacity in the factories that
will (1) support the required manufacturing plan, (2)
preserve the financial viability of the factories, (3) maintain
DC inventory turns at an appropriate level, and (4) reduce
overall supply chain cost.
Inputs for the model are demand, initial average
factory capacity, average DC capacity, and eventually cost.
Demand is based on the company’s historical demand over a
one year time period. Demand includes future orders, two
weeks of safety stock, and at once orders collected for all
demand regions and submitted once per month. Initial
factory capacity is set based on the average factory capacity
negotiated by the company in the previous year. Similarly,
DC capacity is set to the current DC capacity for the
company. There are three sub-models that track factory cost,
transportation cost, and the DC costs.
The model allows the user to observe the tactical
supply chain events based on demand. The primary control
of the system will be the Flex Policy. Flex policy dictates
the increase or decrease of factory capacity. Flex Policy can
either be incorporated as a dynamic feedback loop based on
predefined balance of Factory Cost and DC Inventory Cost
or it can be adjusted manually by the user.
The assumed reference behavior pattern (RBP) is that
the system will come to a steady state at a point when the
factory capacity is sufficient to meet the demand needs and
the cost impact within the feedback loop considering both
the cost to the factory and the cost of DC inventory is
acceptable. It is also hypothesized that when the overall
system is optimal, the subsystems may in fact, not be
optimal.
Model Requirements:
• Continued economic support of the factories
• Production of supply to meet demand in a timely
manner
• Maintain high inventory turns
• Demand has significant spikes
• Factories should be level loaded
• Inventory turn penalties
• Carrying cost of factories
Cost Considerations:
• Air Freight cost
• Factory Costs
o Unused capacity costs
o Exceeding capacity costs
o Flex up and flex down cost to factories
o Production costs – tooling cost

•

DC Inventory costs
o Build risk and cost of closeout
o Preorder risk and cost of unused materials
o Storage cost
o Inventory turns
IV. MODEL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Factory Considerations
The ideal situation from the factory’s sustainability
perspective would be for the factories to be level loaded at
some specified capacity. Realistically, based on demand
fluctuations, the factories are loaded based on a leveling
process that ensures on time production to meet demand and
considers that factories can flex from a baseline value to
upper and lower capacity limits. The impact of flex can be
categorized in terms of the increment and timeframe
associated. Considerations were developed based on in
depth interviews with several major factory groups
primarily in SE Asia such as Indonesia, South Korea,
Taiwan and China.
• Flex up or down of Y percent from the baseline
does not involve significant cost, only the
incremental cost of productivity and is valid only
for duration of time ti for factories i = 1,, n.
• Flex up or down of greater than Y percent from the
baseline involves adding workers/lines or removing
workers/lines respectively and comes at a much
more significant cost and is a permanent change.
• Flex costs to be considered
a. Overhead & Capital, Labor, Worker Moral
b. Shadow cost of worker moral is important
c. Transition cost of flex does not appear to be a
consideration.
• Future considerations would be to consider that the
factories may be grouped with respect to the
relationships and impacts of flexing.
• Underutilizing capacity impacts meeting a
company’s initiative insofar as throughput
increases and reduction in overhead costs.
B. Transportation Considerations
Standard Ocean transportation is the most cost effective
specifically with respect to transit cost. However, in some
cases airfreight transportation is used to reduce time to DC
as significant increased cost. The decision to use airfreight
can be made just prior to the finished goods reaching the
consolidators. Most often, however, the airfreight decision
is made just before manufacturing begins.
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C. DC Considerations

V. MODEL LOGIC

DC capacity is fairly static in that the acquisition of
additional space is expensive to purchase or rent, as is the
cost of preparing the internal structures that are conducive to
displaying and tracking the large number of stock keeping
units (SKUs). The most likely scenario when the DCs have
reached capacity is to leave the product sitting in the yard
and prioritize container unloading. The product in the yard
is included in the DC turn calculation.
The turn rate at the DC is impacted by the volume and
variety of inventory. The closer to capacity and the more
variety the longer it will take process and move inventory
out of the DC and to the customer. For example, during the
low season (Fall), the DCs are only loaded to 70% capacity
with reduced variety of SKUs. Hence, the DC has more
space to create pick faces and more space to maneuver
machinery to pack and ship the inventory to the customer,
so it takes less time.

The model can be thought of in terms of three major
sections (1) demand, (2) manufacturing, and (3) logistics.
These components together represent the entire supply
chain. Flexibility to alter policy is built into the model in
the form of various parameters that are controlled by the
user. A high-level causal loop diagram, shown in Diagram
1, consists of three feed back loops. All loops serve to
increase revenue.
The left most loop depicts the
requirement of prebuilding as the forecast increases,
however, prebuild creates excess inventory inherent with the
risk of building before actual confirmed orders are placed.
The center loop depicts the impact to orders requiring
expedited manufacturing and airfreight due to insufficient
factory capacity. The final loop to the right depicts the
changes to the factory capacity required based on number of
orders.

Diagram 1: Causal Loop Diagram

A. Demand
The demand section of this model depicted in Figure 2 is
designed to take in the actual demand request from the
customer, and the flow of demand into a queue
representing the requests for product to be manufactured.
In most retail companies, the demand is driven by the
customers and will therefore be considered exogenous.
The demand flows into a rectangular box called the
scheduling queue until it is determined when it will need
to be scheduled for manufacturing. The factories would
prefer to build product at a steady rate, to be level loaded.
If this were the case, the factories would be able adjust
their capacity to a constant value, and would no longer
have the additional cost of unused capacity or the high
cost of overtime production. However, demand is not

constant, but rather has peaks and valleys based on the
season, economy, and the product offering. Thus, after the
demand is sent to scheduling queue the decision needs to be
made how to schedule the production, either as early
production (prebuild), standard production, or rush
production.
Demand will flow as early production at a constant
percentage of demand inflow unless the factories are being
underutilized. In this case, more demand can flow out of the
queue as additional prebuild. Prebuild represents schedule
placed into the manufacturing queue before the actual orders
are approved. There is risk associated with prebuild in
terms of possibly building the wrong product or excess
product, if it turns out that product is not demanded in the
actual orders. Therefore it is important to control the
amount of allowable prebuild, and how far in advance of
receiving actual orders prebuild can be scheduled. Prebuild
is controlled by three user controllable parameters: (1) the
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Figure 2: Demand Flow

Key:
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amount of demand inflow that can be prebuilt on a routine
basis, (2) the amount of demand that can be prebuilt if the
factories are being underutilized, and (3) number of
weeks in advance of receiving actual orders that prebuild
can be scheduled.
The demand that does not flow into the
manufacturing schedule as prebuild is scheduled as
standard production unless the standard production
schedule is full. Standard production is manufacturing
the schedule X weeks in advance of when it is needed,
based on actual orders being received, material lead times,
ocean transit times, and the amount of allowable
inventory in the DCs. Any product placed in the schedule
less than X weeks in advance of when it is needed must
be shipped by a faster mode of transportation in order to
deliver the product on time to the customer.
If the factory schedule for standard and prebuild
production is full and there is remaining demand in the
schedule queue, some of the demand will flow directly
into the immediate schedule, called rush in the model. In

Flow into or out of storage

Information transfer

this case, when the entire production schedule is full, the
amount of airfreight increases. This is modeled by
computing the percentage of schedule being added as
rush, and then lagging this figure to reflect the delay
between adding the schedule and when it is actually
shipped to the DC.
B. Manufacturing
The manufacturing section of the model is a
simplification of the true manufacturing process. With
the passage of time, prebuild schedule is becoming
current schedule, modeled as a flow from prebuild to
current. At the same time, the current schedule is
becoming immediate schedule, modeled as a flow from
current to immediate. Actual production is represented as
a flow, labeled producing, from the immediate schedule to
factory inventory, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Manufacturing Time Windows

To specify the model logic mathematically, let X be the
standard lead-time for production, in weeks, and the Y be
the length of the current scheduling period, also in weeks.
Assuming that factory capacity is available, product
demanded at time t can be scheduled for standard
production at time t – (X + Y/2). For example, let’s assume
that today’s date is December 1, 2002, that a customer
requests product by March 1, 2003, and that standard leadtime for product is one month plus or minus 1 week. The
current schedule is represented by the factory’s capacity
available for the weeks of January 27, 2002 through
February 10, 2003. The total amount in the current schedule
would be the factory’s weekly capacity times three, since
standard production for the December demand can be built
in any of the three aforementioned weeks.

Now let the number of weeks for prebuild equal one,
and the percent of prebuild equal to 10% of demand. Then,
ten percent of the demand requested at time t will be
scheduled for manufacture at time t – 1 – (X + Y/2), or one
week prior to the standard production time.
As time passes, the prebuild schedule will flow into the
standard production window for demand requested for
delivery at time t+1, thereby consuming capacity in the
standard production window for demand for time t+1.
Hence, the current schedule consists of both standard
production plus prebuild from previous time periods.
Figure 4 shows the model for scheduling and manufacturing
in more detail.

Figure 4: Demand and Manufacturing

The amount of product that the factory can manufacture
at any given time is determined by the factory weekly
capacity. The company requesting product to be built by the
factory will negotiate some initial level of capacity that it
believes will be needed, this parameter is the initial capacity
for the factory. However, if the demand increases or
decreases significantly the factories can accommodate this
change within limits. Figure 5 depicts the section of the
model that determines the factory weekly capacity.

The logic for adding capacity is as follows. First,
current + immediate schedule is computed. If this total
exceeds the current Factory Weekly Capacity times the sum
of the length of the two queues by more than a specified
percentage, then “adding capacity” is triggered. Capacity
does not increase immediately; rather, it increases after a
specified number of weeks. Additional capacity increases
are not allowed to be triggered during the waiting period.
The logic for capacity reductions is similar, with parameters
being specified for the percentage below capacity that
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Figure 5: Factory Capacity

triggers a reduction and the wait period for a reduction
(these might or might not be the same as for additions).
C. Logistics
The remainder of the logistic flow is quite simple. The
factory can produce what is in the schedule at the rate
determined by the factories capacity to produce. The
standard ocean vessel will ship the factory production unless

it was scheduled for rush production, then it will be shipped
by a more expensive mode, airfreight. The product, either
arrives by air or ocean transportation into the DC yard and is
taken into the DC as inventory. The inventory is relieved
from the DC at the rate of demand less the average
manufacturing lead-time. Figure 6 shows this logic in
diagram form.

Figure 6: Logistics
Figire 6: Logistics
Ocean freight
arriving at Yard

Ship by
Ocean
Ocean
Transit

Factory
Inventory

Shipments
to Customers

Yard to DC

Shipping by Air
Yard
Inventory

Costs in the model accrue as production takes place.
For production costs, the cost/unit depends on how close the
production rate matches capacity. Costs are higher when
the production rate is above capacity due to the incremental
cost of overtime and other factors. Costs are also hight
when production rate is below capacity due to fixed costs
and shadow costs. Transportation cost depends on how
much airfreight is required. The DC costs are computed as
a function of DC turns. When DC turns are high, the DC
contribution to cost per unit is lower, and vice versa. Total
cost per unit is the sum of these three components.

DC
Inventory

•
•
•
•
•
•

D. Control Panel
There are ten controls that the users can adjust in order to
reflect various policies or process anticipated to change.
• Initialization – initial demand.

•

Total Leadtime – average number of weeks to produce
and ship product to the DC.
Length of Current Schedual inWeeks – Average
amount of time requred to order raw materials.
Flex Amount – amount of change in factory capacity
required when a capacity change is warrented.
Short term flex – amount the factory can change its
capacity by simply working overtime.
Average weeks of prebuild – number of weeks in
advance of actual orders product can be built.
Factory Up Flex – the amount of over utilization that
can occur before the factory has to initiate a change in
capacity.
Factory Down Flex – the amount of under utilization
that can occur before the factory has to initiate a change
in capacity.

•
•

Fraction of schedual Queue loaded as prebuild to utilize
fcty – amount of product allowed to be built before
actual orders exist.
Fcty Initial Capapcity – initial factory capacity

E. Example Model Run
The objective of the model is to enable compainies to
evaluate differenent policies and their potential impact. In
this example run we have the parameters set to ones that
represent industry norms.
Figure 9 shows a step increase in demand.
Accordingly, the amount of prebuild increases, as does the
amount of schedule flowing in as standard. When the
schedule queue becomes “full” at about week 20, some of
the schedule flows directly into the immediate schedule, as

rush (shown as vertical stripe, since this flow is normal
zero). Shortly thereafter, the rush ceases, because the
reduced demand inflow allows the schedule to empty
somewhat. The full schedule has triggered an increase in
capacity as well, which come on line about week 28,
allowing the production rate to step up at that time. At
about week 30, the demand drops another notch for a few
weeks. As shown in
Figure 10, the overall schedule changes in a less dramatic
fashion. Figure 11 shows the demand changes, and when the
factory capacity changes in response to these demand
changes. The production rate is also shown for reference, as
the amount shipping via ocean and via air (minimal in this
scenario).

Figure 9: Model Response to Step Changes in Demand

Figure 10: Impact on Schedules
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Figure 11: Impact on Producing, Shipping, and Capacity

VI. MODEL TESTING
The model was initially calibrated in steady state to verify
that all the parameters were synchronized. Then simple
changes in the demand profile were entered and the response
of the model monitored. Various parameters were adjusted,
one at a time, to verify that the change in response was
appropriate. Extreme values were also tested in order to
determine the limits of validity of the model—the conditions
under which the model breaks down and becomes unrealistic
and cannot be used for policy analysis
VII. POLICY ANALYSIS
There are two primary objectives for any supply chain to
consider, cost and customer satisfaction [2]. Using this model
we assume the latter, that is, we must produce what is
requested by when the customer needs it. Then, we consider
various policies to determine the most cost efficient way to
accomplish the aforementioned objective. The three most
significant costs in the supply chain are the DC inventory
turns, factory capacity, and airfreight. Evaluation a policy to
reduce cost must be based on the relative cost of each of these
three components and a balancing between the three. Ideally,
the DC inventory turns would remain as close to 5.5 as
possible, factory capacity and utilization would remain
constant, and airfreight would hold steady between three or
four percent.
We have run two primary scenarios. The first scenario
uses parameter settings that cause the factory capacity to
fluctuate with the demand, whereas the second seeks to better
stabilize the factory capacity.

A. Simulation Test Scenarios
The first scenario represents what is typically done in
industry, the factory capacity and the flex policy attempts to
closely follow demand. The hypothesis is that the capacity
will flex frequently and ultimately lead to significant under
and over utilization of the factories. The threshold that
triggers the factories to flex capacity and the amount that the
capacity changes is set to 5% up or down at a given time,
factories are allowed to flex overall as much as necessary. The
model indicates that when the factories operate this way they
end up flexing very frequently, as one might expect. Even so,
the factories still have ongoing factory over and under
utilization issues. Overall costs are significant since a cost is
incurred each time the factory must change capacity, as well
as the cumulative cost of the under and over utilization of the
factories. The outcome is shown in Figure 12. DC turns
increase initially due to the increased demand coupled with the
requisite delay in the associated inventory increase. Only a
small amount of airfreight is needed. The large fluctuation in
DC turns is not desired, nor is the persistent over and under
utilization of the factories, so alternative policies are explored.
Scenario two is more conservative regarding the addition
or reduction of factory capacity. The hypothesis is that less
frequent changes in factory capacity will lead to less over and
under utilization of the factories. The factory production still
follows demand, but is required to flex up and down
approximately 15% at each interval. The model shows that
factory capacity is more stable, but surprisingly, the overall
under and over utilization is approximately the same as in the
previous scenario. Thus, the cost incurred in this scenario
would be less due to the reduced number of times the factory
must change capacity, with comparable overall under and over
factory utilization. See Figure 13 for a graphical
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Figure 12: Scenario 1, Factory Capacity Follows Demand Fluctuation (two plots)
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representation of the cost components. DC turns and
airfreight were not significantly different from scenario 1.
DC turns increased initially due to the increased demand
coupled with the requisite delay in the associated inventory
increase. Only a small amount of airfreight was needed.
B. Lessons Learned
The outcomes of various policies can be quite dramatic
[1]. We have demonstrated only one of many situations that
could be evaluated for impact. The specific objective of this
simulation was to create a flexible supply chain model for

evaluating different capacity planning policies and
analyzing their impact on overall production cost. The
current model allows the user to input various parameters
that control capacity, scheduling, and the production of
goods. The user can then evaluate the outcomes associated
with the parameter settings. For example, a user could input
parameters that would not allow the factory capacity to
change.
The impact to factory capacity utilization, mode of
transportation and DC inventory turns will be readily
available. A full cost benefit analysis could be performed on
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Figure 13: Scenario 2, Stable Factory Capacity at a Lower Level (two plots)
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each of the outcomes, and fact-based decisions could be
made regarding the best policies to invoke.
Specifically, from the scenarios that we ran, we
determined that the traditional policy, which states that the
factories should flex as little as possible at any one time, in
order to mitigate overall under and over utilization and to
control cost may not be the best policy. Based on the
model, and it does seem reasonable, requiring larger
changes in factory capacity overall achieves the desired
outcome of reducing overall cost. The model has provided
significant information as to the potential impact of
particular policies and their respective outcomes. It is

evident that simulation can be a valuable tool for evaluating
FSC various policies and their associated outcomes.
C. Next Steps
The next steps for the model will be to incorporate
feedback from the DC turn rate to upstream aspect such as
scheduling and production rates. This will aid in the
determination of attractive policies that not only consider
the cost at the factory, but also factors in the cost of
fluctuating DC inventory.
A second consideration for the model will be to include
additional costing components to allow the user to enter the

relative or real costs associated with each aspect of the
model. It is intended that the costing components will
directly impact scheduling and production processes and aid
in determining the most cost effective manufacturing
parameters for balancing the tradeoffs between factory
capacity utilization, mode of transportation and DC
inventory turns.
APPENDIX

Reference Behavior Patterns
This section was prepared before the model was built to
indicate how the real world actually behaves. This served as
a reference during model testing as to whether the model
behavior was consistent with reality or not.
1. Current Situation – Start of Spring (highest volume
from lowest volume)
a. Factory averages 7% pre-build
b. Factory will average 5% late product
c. Factory average load is 90%
d. Transportation average air freight is 3.3%
e. DC inventory turn average 4.4 (want 5.5 – 6)
f. SKU count at approximately 12,000
2. Increase Factory capacity by 50% (High season into
low season – spring into fall)
a. Factory will average 0 pre-build
b. Factory will average 0 late product
c. Factory average load should be 60%
d. Transportation average air freight should be
0%
e. DC inventory turn average should be just over
3 for the time period lagging the demand by 2
months.
f. Sku count consistent
3. Demand Flux – demand spike after low (holiday into
spring)
a. Factory will increase to12% pre-build for
duration of spike
b. Factory will increase the amount of late
product to 7% for duration of spike
c. Factory average load should not exceed 95%
d. Transportation average air freight increase
proportionally with late product
e. DC inventory turn should increase to about 4.5
at lag 3 and maybe as high at lag 5

f. SKU count consistent
Steady state objectives
a. Bounded factory flux to reasonable levels –
strive for level load
b. Steady DC turns at about 5.6 to 6
c. Cost efficacy
In fact, the model does NOT behave exactly as
described above. This is due in part due to model
inadequacies, but is due to the fact that the description of
reference behavior was based on experience and not factual
data, so it was not held to be an absolute reference.
4.
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